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TORTS - LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT - RYLANDS v. FLETCHER NECESSITY FOR CoNTROL OF PREMISES - Defendant, under a contract with
the federal government to dredge the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, deposited the effluent material dredged from the canal upon a disposal area owned
by the government. The work was carried on under government supervision,
and neither the government inspectors nor defend11nt's employees knew, nor
apparently could they have known, of any defect in the retaining wall which
had {lreviously been built by the government to hold back the material. Defendant had had nothing to do with prior dredging operations, by which the
level of fixed earth behind the retaining wall had been raised considerably.
After the close of work on January 14, 1936, a portion of the retaining wall
gave way, emptying earth and other material into a creek which separated
the government property from plaintiff's land. This prevented plaintiff's access
to his property by boat, and prevented the efficient operation of a weir maintained by plaintiff to let water into and out of a pond in which plaintiff raised
carp for the market. Plaintiff claimed the aid of the principle of liability without
fault. Held, that the defendant did not "occupy," in the sense of possession
taken for the purpose of exercising control of the land, and that the doctrine of
liability without fault therefore did not apply. Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific

Co., (Md. 1939) 4 A. (2d) 757.
It is sometimes said that the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,1 or liability
without fault, is not applied by American courts,2 but there are decisions to
the contrary. 8 Certainly, the doctrine is much more restricted in this country
than in England, whether the reason is the ascendency of business interests
rather than those of the landed gentry,4 a greater influence of moral ethics on

1 L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affd. L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868). Justice Blackburn
stated the doctrine thus (1 Ex. at 279): "the person who, for his own purposes,
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
2 Harris, "Liability without Fault," 6 TULANE L. REv. 337 (1932).
8 Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 106 Mass. 194 (1870); Wilson v. New Bedford,
108 Mass. 261 (1871); Cahill v. Eastman, ~8 Minn. 292 (1872); Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296 (1895); Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 54 Ohio
St. 532 (1896); Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 86 Pa. 401 (1878); Exner
v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 510, 80 A. L. R.
686 at 692; Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952, 60
A. L. R. 475 at 483 (1928); French v. Center Creek Powder Mfg. Co., 173 Mo.
App. 220, 158 S. W. 723 (1913); Lawson v. Price, 45 Md. 123 (1876). See
expressions similar to the doctrine in Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468,
12 S. W. 937 (1890), and Parker v. Larsen, 86 Cal. 236 (1890). For discussions of
the application of the doctrine in this country, see Harper, "Liability without Fault,"
30 MxcH. L. REv. 1001 (1932); Bohlen, "The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher," 59
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 298, 373, 423 (19u); Wigmore, "Responsibility for Tortious
Acts," 7 HARV. L. REv. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
4 HARPER, ToRTs, § 158 (1933).
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the law,5 or other reasons. 6 One restriction usually placed on the application
of the doctrine is that of privilege in the non-natural user. 7 Though not fully
expressed in the principal case, this may have had much to do with the court's
refusal to apply the doctrine, inasmuch as the defendant was carrying on the
work under a contract with the government, and under federal supervision.8
However, the cour,t here made the type of occupancy the basis of inapplicability. It was said that the defendant had no "right or ownership or control of
the site of the undertaking," but occupied only temporarily, as a business
licensee. The federal government owned the land where the foreign material
was amassed, and the defendant was not even a lessee of the government. This
restriction is consistent with the usual requisites of liability without fault, 9
5
There has been considerable controversy over the historical development of
the law of torts in this respect. Justice Holmes maintained that early Germanic and
Anglo-Saxon liability was based solely on fault, since vengeance and the blood-feud
contemplated a moral wrong, and that liability without fault was a modern concept.
HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW (1881). Most authorities, however, seem to have
accepted Dean Wigmore's theory that early liability had no connection with moral
culpability, and that ethical considerations have been adopted by the law until our
modern notion of liability without fault is left as a remnant of the older law. Wigmore, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts," 7 HARV. L. REv. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
But see Isaacs, "Fault and Liability," 31 HARV. L. REv. 954 (1918), where the
various theories and articles are collected. Professor Isaacs urges that Justice Holmes'
exposition of the early law is more logical, but that liability without fault is a recurring
phenomenon, the third cycle of which we are just entering. Liability without fault
is always just an exceptional principle, Professor Isaacs points out, and normally liaability is based on fault.
6
"The principle is sanctioned, in one way or another, consciously or unconsciously, in every court of the country. But (a) it is not invariably held to control in
cases having facts like Fletcher v. Rylands; and (b) the tendency may perhaps be
said to be in many States to restrict to as few as possible the classes of situations to be
governed by the principle." Wigmore, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts," 7 HARV.
L. REv. 315, 383, 441 at 455, note 3 (1894).
7
HARPER, ToRTS, § 161 (1933): "There is what may be regarded as a justifiable non-natural user when the same is specifically authorized by law or sanctioned
by custom, or when a duty to make such user is actually imposed by statute." The
American Law Institute expresses the same privilege. 3 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 521
(1938).
8
The court stated that defendant was engaged in "an authorized public work,"
and emphasized the fact that government inspectors had carefully supervised the work.
Besides denying the applicability of the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and private
nuisance, the court discussed causation, which, after all, may have been the soundest
basis for the denial of liability. The causation difficulties were those mentioned by
Lord Blackburn in Rylands v. Fletcher: the slide may have been caused either from
latent defects which existed before the work of the defendant began, or from a secret
and unobservable operation of natural causes; i.e., the slide may have been caused by
the acts of third parties in depositing the material from prior dredging operations,
or by vis major or act of God.
9
Harper states the requisites thus: "the plaintiff must show (a) that his harm
is of the general class that the rule is designed to protect against, that is, it must be of
that type and character which made the defendant's conduct the basis of liability;
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although, to the writer's knowledge, this specific restriction has not heretofore
been applied. The defendant had contracted to assume responsibility for damages occurring as a result of its fault or negligence, but this would not seem
to be sufficient to shift liability without fault from the landowner to the licensee.
The argument is frequently made that American courts are too shy of the
doctrine of liability without fault, and that it should be more extensively applied
in this country.10 But whether the courts continue to restrict the doctrine, or
decide to expand it, it is submitted that it should not exend to one in the
position of this defendant, because control of the premises is necessary to prevent escape of the accumulated material, and hence is essential to the doctrine.11
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(b) that he is of the general class of persons protected thereby, and (c) that the harm
occurred in such a manner that it will not be unfair to hold the defendant liable
therefor." HARPER, TORTS, § 162 (1933).
10 Harris, "Liability without Fault," 6 TULANE L. REv. 337 (1932); Bohlen,
"The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher," 59 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 298, 373, 423 (1911).
But see Isaacs, "Fault and Liability," 31 HARV. L. REV. 954 (1918), where it is
maintained that an ethical standard is the ideal of our legal system, and that the doctrine of liability without fault is merely an aberration therefrom.
The doctrine is being developed more widely by legislation such as workmen's compensation and compulsory insurance acts. It may be better to develop the
law in this manner than to impose strict liability by means of "judicial legislation."
See, in this connection, 1 ScHNEIDER, THE LAw OF WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION,
§ 2 (1932); Brosman, "The Statutory Presumption," 5 TULANE L. REv. 17 (1930);
Smith, "Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts," 27 HARV. L. REv. 235, 344
(1914).
11 Many American courts speak of strict liability for "extrahazardous" activities,
without referring to Rylands v. Fletcher, but the result is the same. Green v. General
Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928), and cases collected 60 A. L. R.
475 (1929). Still, in such cases, the defendant was held to have acted at his peril in
engaging in the dangerous activity on his own or leased premises.

